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hoped to raise a family.
1 Leslie and Ben came to love Pawnee and the community. When the empty lot across the street went up for sale in 1994, they immediately purchased it as an investment property. They hoped to use the investment proceeds to pay for their children's college education.
Fast-forward 20 years. Leslie and Ben's triplets were high school seniors, and they tried to sell their investment property so that they could use the proceeds to pay for their children's educations. While they were trying to sell their investment property, they learned that Pawnee passed a law, Ordinance 30, five years prior prohibiting all development of their investment property. In other words, Ordinance 30 denied Leslie and Ben all economically beneficial use of their land.
Pawnee's planning commission has an application process in which residents can request compensation for alleged regulatory takings. Leslie and Ben thus went to the planning commission to try to receive compensation for the value of the property they had lost. They submitted documents detailing the value of their property and how they purchased the property as an investment parcel. The planning commission denied their request for compensation.
Soon after, Leslie and Ben sued Pawnee, claiming that Ordinance 30 caused a per se regulatory taking.
2 Because Leslie and Ben hired a savvy lawyer, they brought their takings claim in Indiana state court. The lawyer was aware of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which requires such takings plaintiffs to ripen their case by seeking compensation through adequate state procedures, 3 and how some circuit courts interpret "adequate state procedure" to mean seeking just compensation in state court before turning to the federal judiciary. 4 After Leslie and Ben sued in state court, Pawnee began engaging in gamesmanship. Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben's lawsuit to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows defendants to remove any claim to federal court if the case could have originally been filed there. 5 Because the federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction based on the Fifth Amendment takings claim, 6 the state court granted Pawnee's motion to remove Leslie and Ben's regulatory takings claim to the Southern District of Indiana.
Two years after Pawnee removed Leslie and Ben's takings claim to federal court, the city moved to dismiss the case as unripe because the couple had not litigated in state court, the adequate state procedure for obtaining compensation. 7 The Southern District of Indiana agreed with Pawnee and dismissed Leslie and Ben's takings claim as unripe, despite the case having been removed by the city from state court of federal court. 8 In a final salvo and at great expense, Leslie and Ben filed their claim in state court again. This time, Pawnee litigated the issue through Indiana state court. At the end of the case, the Indiana state court denied Leslie and Ben's just compensation claim. Leslie and Ben then sought to return to federal court to litigate their now-ripe Fifth Amendment just compensation claim. But the Southern District of Indiana invoked San Remo v. County and City of San Francisco, and held that issue preclusion applied to the state court litigation-which Williamson County required they endure. 9 After years of litigation, Leslie and Ben grew tired. They resigned to the fact that they would never receive just compensation. They gave up.
Leslie and Ben's story is not unusual. 10 Williamson County has functionally barred property owners from accessing federal court. Indeed, Williamson County makes it very difficult for takings plaintiffs to access any court. 11 Local governments engage in a procedural game, to federal court, then arguing case is unripe). 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012 12 In his dissent from denial, which Justice Kennedy joined, Justice Thomas noted that "the justification for Williamson County's state-litigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic." 13 He noted that Williamson County has inspired "gamesmanship" from lower courts 14 -like that which Pawnee used. Though the Supreme Court did not accept Arrigoni, some Justices are apparently aware of Williamson County's shell game 15 and are looking to overrule it. Coupled with Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in San Remo, which questioned Williamson County's logic, 16 property rights advocates may have cautious optimism that the Court will soon eliminate the state litigation rule.
Now that some Justices have signaled their interest in revisiting Williamson County, property rights experts and jurisdictional mavens must present a "cert-worthy" case to the Court. 17 Many considerations go into deciding whether a case is "cert-worthy," such as identifying a circuit split, 18 but many commentators have written about Williamson County's incoherence and why the court should overrule it. 19 Instead of asking the Court to overrule Williamson County, plaintiffs should provide the Justices an opportunity to make incremental changes.
family's and the Rainey brother's struggle to get a court to hear their takings case).
12. Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. sued the Planning Commission for an unconstitutional regulatory taking.
26
The District Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict for the commission on the takings claim. 27 That court held that there was no taking, reasoning that Tennessee law estopped the Planning Commission from applying the regulation that allegedly caused the taking. 28 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that evidence supported the jury verdict and finding that there was a taking because the Commission denied the bank all economic use of its land for some time.
29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether "Federal, State, and Local government must pay money damages to a landowner whose property allegedly had been 'taken' temporarily by application of government regulation."
30
Instead of answering this question, the Court created a novel jurisdictional rule for Fifth Amendment claims. First, the Court reasoned that Hamilton Bank's claim was unripe. 31 It said that the bank had not received a final decision regarding its zoning ordinance because it did not seek variances that would have allowed it to develop its land. 32 Second, the Court held that a Fifth Amendment claim is unripe until the state actor denies just compensation. If a state provides "adequate procedure" to obtain just compensation, property owners cannot claim a Fifth Amendment violation until they seek and are denied compensation through a state procedure. 33 The Court wrote that the government violates the Fifth Amendment only when it takes property and fails to pay compensation. 34 This means takings plaintiffs must first seek compensation from the state or local government before suing in federal court.
35
Williamson County's ripeness rule can be distilled into two prongs: a plaintiff's taking claim is unripe until (1) the government makes a final decision and (2) the claimant seeks just compensation through an adequate state procedure for obtaining compensation and is denied. But Justice Stevens dismissed the Second Circuit's argument, reasoning that there is no right to have a federal claim vindicated in a federal forum. 61 Recognizing the dilemma that the Second Circuit identified, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, joined by three other justices, which questioned the logic of Williamson County. The Chief Justice agreed that the full faith and credit statute precluded federal court review in San Remo.
62 But the Chief Justice was unsure why a claimant must seek compensation in state court before going to federal court. 63 He questioned the underlying idea that state courts were better than federal courts at resolving land use cases. 64 In addition, he observed that plaintiffs may bring their land use claims directly to federal court if they involve other constitutional rights, like the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.
65
The Chief Justice insisted that Williamson County led to an absurd result and put the Fifth Amendment in an inferior constitutional position. Though he did not explicitly call for Williamson County to be overruled, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that he thought its reasoning was suspect and that the Court should reconsider the case.
66

C. The Emergence of the Ripeness-Removal and Williamson County-San Remo Traps and the Efforts to Untangle Them.
After San Remo, the ripeness-removal and Williamson CountySan Remo traps fully formed, making it nearly impossible for takings litigants to sue in federal court. The ripeness-removal trap arises when a property owner files a takings claim in state court, following Williamson County's requirements, but the government then removes the Fifth Amendment claim to federal court based on subject matter jurisdiction. 67 Once the case is in federal court, the government argues that the landowner's case must be dismissed because the litigant has not used an adequate procedure for obtaining compensation. Often, courts hold that these cases are unripe because the litigant did not go through state court to seek just compensation.
68 This is so even though the property is only in federal court because the government removed their case.
69
The Williamson County-San Remo trap occurs when a takings litigant unsuccessfully seeks compensation in state court. 70 Because he has sought compensation in state court, issue preclusion applies to the takings claim and he will be unable to sue in federal court. 71 In other words, the procedure that ripens a case for federal review also prevents federal courts from hearing the issue. 72 Fortunately, for takings litigants, the Supreme Court and circuit courts have lessened the impact of these traps. The Court has repeatedly held that Williamson County's ripeness rule is a prudential doctrine, not a jurisdictional requirement.
73
Jurisdictional requirements are constitutionally mandated and must be satisfied before a court may hear a case. 74 On the other hand, prudential requirements are court-developed policies that allow the judiciary to decline to hear some cases even where jurisdiction exists. 75 Because Williamson County is not a constitutional mandate, some courts have held that its requirements may be waived. 78 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have functionally eliminated the ripeness-removal trap, partially by recognizing this rule. In Sansotta, a town removed a takings case properly filed in state court to federal court. 79 A year after removing the case, the town argued that Sansotta's claim was unripe because he did not seek compensation in state court. 80 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Town's argument, explaining that it would not tolerate gamesmanship. 81 The court held that the government waives Williamson County's prudential requirement if it removes a case to federal court. 82 According to the Fourth Circuit, a defendant cannot accede to federal jurisdiction by removing a takings case and then argue that the federal court does not have jurisdiction. 83 Moreover, heavily relying on Sansotta, the Sixth Circuit made a similar holding in Lily Investments.
84
By recognizing the waiver rule, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits ensure that takings plaintiffs will at least be able to present their claims 76 
A. Williamson County Undermines the Just Compensation Clause's Guarantees and the Federal Judiciary's Responsibility to Hear Just Compensation Cases
The Fifth Amendment is a self-executing constitutional provision that guarantees just compensation whenever the government takes someone's property. 88 Government must pay for both physical and regulatory takings. 89 As with other federal constitutional provisions, federal courts seemingly have a responsibility to hear federal questions.
Proponents 91. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342. 92. Id. These cases are easily distinguishable though. In Migra, the Court held that a teacher who successfully sued the school district she worked for and its administration in state court could not bring a Section 1983 suit in federal court based on the same facts later on. Because she has already litigated the core facts in state court, she could not now litigate the same issues in federal court. Unlike in Migra, San Remo Hotel had the rug pulled under its feet. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 328 (denying opportunity to reserve claim under England). In Allen, a heroin dealer brought a § 1983 suit in federal court against the St. Louis Police Department after a police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 449 U.S. at 92-93. However, the Supreme Court held that res judicata applied to the dealer's claim because the search and seizure issue had been litigated during his state court trial. Thus, the federal judiciary would not provide the dealer a second chance to re-litigate his claims because he should have brought his § 1983 claim with his However, even if preclusion properly applied in Migra and Allen, federal courts still have a responsibility to resolve federal issues and play a necessary role in protecting constitutional rights. 93 In its earliest days, the Court explained that federal courts bring finality and unity to points of contention. 94 Article III of the Constitution requires that federal courts be able to provide the last word for federal questions.
95
Although state courts play an important role in enforcing constitutional rights, federal courts ultimately must define them.
96
When federal courts, namely the Supreme Court, provide the final say for constitutional provisions, they ensure that rights are protected equally across the country.
If Court has elsewhere recognized 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic, when the issue is only whether the government may search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to 'second-guess the City's considered judgments,' when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners' homes.").
101. 119 At some point, rational people will simply give up because it will no longer be worth defending their rights, thus putting a de facto expiration date on the Takings Clause. 120 The ripeness-removal trap contributes to a two-track justice system for the poor and the wealthy. First, property owners will generally be at a disadvantage litigating against the government because the government usually has more resources. 121 Second, because property owners are suing the government under the Fifth Amendment, the government can remove their case to federal court. 122 Moreover, once a property owner is in federal court, most circuits allow the government to send the plaintiff back to state court because of Williamson County. 123 While the government may be able to financially afford this litigation, many property owners are unable to do so. 124 Not all Fifth Amendment litigants will be at a disadvantage. The wealthy can afford to vindicate their rights while the average person will struggle to pay their legal bills. 125 The wealthy will have an easier time complying with the state-litigation requirement and a better chance at ultimately entering federal court. Indeed, the wealthy may not even have to face eminent domain proceedings in the first place. 126 For instance, if a city is aware of a person's assets and the possibility of a prolonged legal battle, they might be reluctant to take any actions that may cause a taking. Instead, the government might prefer to target politically and economically vulnerable property owners because minorities and the poor make easier targets. 
A. The Minimalist Solution to the Williamson County Dilemma
The major challenge in undoing Williamson County's problems has been getting the Court to reexamine the case. 128 Since San Remo was decided, creating the Williamson County-San Remo trap, the Supreme Court has had many chances to revisit Williamson County, but has declined to do so. 129 Arrigoni is the most recent denial and the 
B. The Court and Minimalism
A problem for takings litigants seeking to overrule Williamson County is that the Court is a minimalist institution. This has been especially true since Chief Justice Roberts took the bench.
136
"Minimalists try to decide cases rather than to set down broad rules; they ask that decisions be narrow rather than wide."
137 This theory requires jurists to decide no more than they must to ensure the resolution of a case. 138 One common trait of a minimalist court is that 135. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that "special justifications needed to reverse an opinion must go beyond demonstrations (much less assertions) that it was wrong; that is the very point of stare decisis" in the context of potentially overruling case requiring compulsory union dues for collective bargaining).
136. Sykes, supra note 20, at 31 (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's preference to use minimalist techniques to avoid conflicts with the political branches).
137 it will decline to overrule previous cases, abiding by stare decisis to promote stability and predictability of the law.
139
One theory suggests that denying certiorari is a form of minimalism. 140 Professor Cass Sunstein is the most notable proponent of this theory. 141 He argues that the Court may deny certiorari when it wants more information about the legal facts of a case, when it is prudent to wait before addressing a major issue, or when it is trying to avoid issuing an incorrect decision. 142 As Professor Sunstein observes, "Denials are reasonless.
They are entirely rule-free and untheorized."
143 Because denial of certiorari is the easiest way to leave a case undecided, it is appropriately characterized as a form of minimalism.
Knowing the Supreme Court is a minimalist institution, and assuming denying certiorari is a form of minimalism, takings litigants probably should not ask the Court to overrule Williamson County.
144
If a litigant does so, the Court may follow its minimalist tradition and simply deny review. For this reason, many recent property rights cases before the Court have merely asked the Court to refine its prior decisions. 145 For example, San Remo was the last case in which the Court discussed Williamson County in significant detail. 146 There, the petition only asked whether issue preclusion applied under that precise factual scenario.
147
Given that the Court likes to act in a minimalist fashion, the next step for those seeking to undo Williamson County's damage is to findor design-a case that would limit Williamson County and San Remo's reach, but does not ask the Court to overrule either case. The ideal case would feature a petitioner that had plausibly complied with the ripeness requirements, but did not litigate in state court. If a petitioner had tried to comply with Williamson County, the Court may be more 139 likely to grant certiorari because it allows them to simply reject an overly broad reading of the adequate state procedure requirement.
148
Litigants like Leslie and Ben-a middle-class couple who tried to comply with the abstruse legal requirements-may appear especially sympathetic.
149
C. Using Williamson County's Language to Design a Minimalist Case
To find the best "cert-worthy" case, it is useful to start with Williamson County's plain language. According to Justice Blackmun, aggrieved property owners must "seek compensation through the procedures the state has provided for doing so." 151 What constitutes "an adequate procedure" is not defined in Williams County, but a few observations are noteworthy. Justice Blackmun never says that "adequate procedure" requires state court litigation, like so many circuit courts have claimed. 152 Moreover, "an" and "procedure" are singular terms, suggesting that property owners need only pursue one procedure.
An attractive minimalist case would involve a takings litigant who used a non-judicial, state-sanctioned procedure provided for obtaining compensation instead of seeking compensation through state court. After being denied compensation through this procedure, the litigant One lingering difficulty is that "adequate procedure for seeking compensation" is still vague. To cure Williamson County's defects, "an adequate procedure" will have two components: (1) it must be nonjudicial, and (2) it should be a procedure that allows the municipality to provide compensation. A good rule of thumb for the first prong would be to ask whether the procedure was created by the legislature, such as an agency, commission, or board. 155. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("It is not clear to me that Williamson County was correct in demanding that, once a government entity has reached a final decision with respect to a claimant's property, the claimant must seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court."); Overstreet, supra note 98, at 118-20.
156 created by the legislature, that non-judicial procedure would likely satisfy the first prong. 159 The procedure must be non-judicial to avoid issue preclusion. 160 As to the second prong, courts should understand compensation to be a payment to recoup for a loss. 161 Thus, a takings litigant would satisfy Williamson County's requirement when he seeks a monetary payment for a taking from an agency, commission, or board.
Several examples of what should be adequate state procedures might help illustrate what would ripen a case for federal review. 162 For instance, the California Tort Claims Act would probably be an adequate procedure. 163 The law provides governmental entities and takings plaintiffs a chance to negotiate a settlement for an alleged taking. 164 For example, say Sacramento, California declares that a plot of land is an environmentally sensitive zone, thus preventing its property owner from building anything on their plot. 165 Because Sacramento has denied all economically viable use of their land, the property owner wants to file a per se takings claim. 166 167 In that case, George Mecouch purchased "service credits" from the Pension Board of the County of Milwaukee to ensure that his retirement benefits would vest. 168 After receiving confirmation that his retirement benefits would vest, Mecouch retired. Twenty-five years later (and four years after he had started drawing a pension), the pension board informed him that it had improperly allowed him to purchase service credits. 169 Thus, the pension board suspended his pension.
170
Mecouch sought to have the pension board reinstate his payments.
171 First, Mecouch sought to have his payments reinstated through the pension board's appeal process. 172 The appeal board did not restore his payments, 173 although it did say that Mecouch's claim was ready for judicial review.
174
Because the board informed the litigant that, "he was entitled to seek judicial review," his claim should be ripe for review in state or federal court. 175 The procedure was enough to secure compensation because if the board had agreed with Mecouch, his money would have been returned and his takings argument rendered moot. Because Mecouch used a procedure that could have provided him all the relief he was seeking, his claim should have been ripe under this proposed test. taking as soon as any government official denies just compensation. 177 These advocates may argue that any minimalist case should acknowledge when a constitutional injury occurs.
This minimalist decision would recognize the scope of a constitutional injury and recognize that federal courts need flexibility. Courts see many meritless takings claims. Pro se litigants-and some low-quality attorneys-often sue cities for takings under strained theories. 178 Many pro se litigants poorly design their cases, causing their suits to burden an already overworked judiciary. 179 By keeping a requirement for takings plaintiffs to use a non-judicial state procedure, lower courts provide these plaintiffs a reliable way to get compensation while relieving pressure on federal judges. In addition, if a plaintiff fails to get compensation, through a state non-judicial procedure, they can then go to federal court.
The minimalist solution also would not undo Williamson County's prudential nature. If a landowner suffers an egregious taking and files a well-crafted complaint, and the facts are well developed, a federal court may choose to hear the case immediately without requiring him to seek compensation through a non-judicial procedure. 180 By narrowing "an adequate procedure for receiving compensation" to a single state non-judicial procedure, the Court would provide federal courts maximum flexibility while protecting property rights.
Though Williamson County has caused much heartache for property owners and their advocates, the Supreme Court does not seem eager to revisit the case. 181 Thus, it is necessary to present a case that would attract the Court's attention. An ideal case may be one in which a takings litigant used a non-judicial state procedure, such as the California Tort Claims Act, to obtain compensation, but was still denied access to the federal courts because he did not seek compensation in state court. Such a case would highlight how a good actor who tried to comply with the Court's strict requirements could not get relief, even after complying. To limit Williamson County's damage, takings plaintiffs should leave an opening for the Court to reject the state-court litigation requirement without overruling Williamson County.
D. Rejecting the State Litigation Rule Would Eliminate the Ripeness-Removal and Williamson County-San Remo Traps
The immediate benefit from this ruling is that it would eliminate the Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps. If a state procedure, such as the California Tort Claim Act, ripens a landowner's case, then issue preclusion will never arise because using these procedures does not result in a final judgment. Additionally, federal courts could continue to decline to hear poorly developed or nonsensical takings claims. 182 Landowners will also no longer fall prey to unfair gamesmanship tactics. In other words, eliminating the Williamson County-San Remo trap through my minimalist proposal ensures that property owners do not resort to federal courts as a first stop, but it still guarantees that property owners will be able to access the federal judiciary, while preserving judicial discretion to prevent docket overrun. 183 In addition, holding that a state non-judicial procedure could satisfy Williamson County would also eliminate the ripeness-removal trap. This would prevent governments from using Williamson County as a stalling tactic. If a takings litigant seeks compensation through a non-judicial state procedure, then the government cannot seek removal because the case is not in court.
184 After a takings litigant uses a non-judicial procedure for seeking compensation, the litigant's claim would be ripe, and he could sue immediately in federal court. 185 Alternatively, if a takings plaintiff sues in state court and has his case removed to federal court, he would not be sent back to state court for failing to satisfy Williamson County because he satisfied Williamson County by seeking compensation through a state non-judicial procedure. 186 Thus, a narrow holding that a state non-judicial procedure can satisfy Williamson County would undo the Williamson County-San Remo trap. After compensation is denied in a state non-judicial procedure, a takings claim would be ripe for judicial review.
187
A municipality also could not argue that issue preclusion applies because there is no final state court judgment, as was the case in San Remo. 188 Thus, allowing the litigant to keep his suit in federal court would not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
To be sure, Williamson County would retain the prudential exception for when a municipality engages in gamesmanship or a case is well-developed, 189 and the futility exception would still apply. 190 By using minimalism and holding that a state non-judicial procedure satisfies Williamson County, the Supreme Court could undo the Williamson County-San Remo and ripeness-removal traps. 340 (1986) and the "meaningful application" and "reapplication" process in determining whether a county decision is final). aspect of the Constitution.
E. What if Lower Courts or Municipal Governments
197
Interpreting adequate procedure for obtaining compensation to include non-judicial state procedures would help put property rights on equal footing with other rights.
